CONSTITUTION OF REALITY IN LATE WITTGENSTEIN

LA CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REALIDAD EN EL ÚLTIMO WITTGENSTEIN

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INFORMACIÓN DEL ARTÍCULO	ABSTRACT/RESUMEN
	Abstract: This article discusses the issue of the constitution of reality and the role of language in it in the late Wittgenstein. Here the author examines the key role of grammar in the connection of language with reality and distinguishes 'levels' of constitution: (1) the ontological relation in the triad language-thought-reality, (2) intersubjective 'conventional' level, (3) a level beyond any conventions (ethics or mystical) within the realm of one reality. I argue that for Wittgenstein language was a vehicle of thought, however, he admitted processes of thinking that are inexpressible with words, for their expression we may other languages: image-language, sound-language, and gesture-language. Language reflects a human way of thinking, if we had another way of thinking we would have another grammar and other concepts. The essential nature of the human mind is concept formation. However, the concept of mind itself is a hypothesis. The harmony between thought and reality is found in the grammar of language. But an agreement of thought and reality is not a simple representation, along with the method of projection, Wittgenstein emphasizes the method of application. And the only key to the relationship between language and reality is grammar. **Resumen:** Este artículo analiza la cuestión de la constitución de la realidad y el papel del lenguaje en ella en el Wittgenstein segundo. Aquí la autora examina el papel clave de la gramática en la conexión del lenguaje con la realidad y distingue 'niveles' de constitución: (1) la relación ontológica en la tríada lenguaje-pensamiento-realidad, (2) nivel intersubjetivo 'convencional', (3) un nivel más allá de cualquier convención (ética y estética) dentro del ámbito de una realidad. Sostengo que para Wittgenstein el lenguaje era un vehículo de pensamiento, sin embargo, admitió procesos de pensamiento que son

> inexpresables con palabras, para su expresión podemos utilizar otros lenguajes: lenguaje visual, lenguaje sonoro y lenguaje de gestos. El lenguaje refleja una forma de pensar humana, si tuviéramos otra forma de pensar tendríamos otra gramática y otros conceptos. La naturaleza esencial de la mente humana es la formación de conceptos. No obstante, el concepto de mente en sí es una hipótesis. La armonía entre el pensamiento y la realidad se encuentra en la gramática del lenguaje. Pero un acuerdo del pensamiento y la realidad no es una simple representación; junto con el método de proyección, Wittgenstein enfatiza el método de aplicación. Y la única clave para la relación entre el lenguaje y la realidad es la gramática.

Possibility is a shadow of reality.
AWL (2001, p. 157)

Introduction

Later Wittgenstein never considered the world as independent or opposite to human beings. The object of the investigation for Wittgenstein was the complex of human activity with its inextricable part — human language. Human language was considered not a simple means of communication but a part of human life. By language, we understand not only a complex of words and phrases but the whole human activity: gesture-language, body-language, cultural norms, agreements on meanings, and correspondent human behavior, i.e., a plurality of the forms of life. Forms of life are *pre-given* and let human beings create a particular picture of the world (a social-cultural world with agreed norms and grammar of language-games). Language-games arise within the background of forms of life. Hence, language-games are manifestations of the manifold of language. 'We must plow over language in its entirety' (Wittgenstein, 2018/2020, p. 44). 'Well, language does connect up with my own life. And what is called "language" is something made up of heterogeneous elements and the way it meshes with life is infinitely various' (Wittgenstein, 1974/1980, §29, p. 66). For instance, in the *Blue Book*, the concept of *language-game* was understood simpler than in Wittgenstein's further writings where he realized the complexity of everyday language methods of using signs. At the very beginning of *Philosophical Investigations* (*PI*), (Wittgenstein, 2009), he wrote that the whole process of using words in a language (a language consisting of the words like 'block', 'pillar', 'plate', and 'beam'), is like one of those games which make children learn their native language. 'I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven the 'language-game' (2009, §7). (Ich werde

auch das Ganze, der Sprache und der Tätigkeiten, mit denen sie verwoben ist, das 'Sprachspiel' nennen) (2009, §7). Further, in the *PI*, Wittgenstein already writes that a language-game is a language and the actions in which it is interwoven. In *On Certainty* (Wittgenstein, 1969), a meta-language-game from this point of view is impossible. Words do not have rigorously fixed meanings, and their meanings depend on use or application. Hence, the interaction with the world with the help of language is a combination of different language-games. In Wittgenstein's words, speaking of language is an activity, it is a form of lime. The conscious human being is impossible without language, it is a 'speaking being'. *Homo sapiens* is the one with *homo dicens*. As Karl Bühler said, language is 'the most human thing about human beings' (Bühler, 1934/1990, 1vi Preface). Heidegger (2001, p. 187) emphasized that 'only speech enables man to be the living being he is as man.' He continued referring to Wilhelm von Humboldt — 'It is as one who speaks that man is — man' (2001, p. 187).

Levels of the Constitution

Concerning the topic of the *constitution* of reality, Wittgenstein left a few clear passages. However, it becomes evident that for Wittgenstein exists only one world. 'But it's ridiculous to want to delimit the world or reality' (Wittgenstein, 2005, p. 52^e). 'There are no such things as general discourses about the world and language' (p. 54^e). My task was an attempt to reconstruct how he understood this issue. Here I focus attention on three 'layers' within one reality.

- The **first** one is a *grammatical* relationship within the triad language-thought-reality.
- The **second** one is the intersubjective (conventional) level.
- The **third** one is the ethical or *mystical*.

I intentionally will not use the term metaphysical because for Wittgenstein the realm of ethics is not metaphysics, his 'mysticism' is much connected with 'religious feeling'. All these levels have nothing in common with metaphysics, Wittgenstein never distinguished two worlds within our reality. 'A phenomenon is not a symptom of something else: it is the reality. A phenomenon is not a symptom of something else which alone makes the

proposition true or false: it itself is what verifies the proposition' (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 283). Wittgenstein never opposed human psychological life, conscious life to the world of objects. '38 The memory and the reality must be in *one* space. Also: the image and the reality are in *one* space' (Wittgenstein, 1998, §38, p. 13).

> A sense-datum is the appearance of this tree, whether "there really is a tree standing there" or a dummy, a mirror image, an hallucination, etc. A sense-datum is the appearance of the tree, and what we want to say is that its representation in language is only one description, but not the essential one. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 271 and the same paragraph we meet in Wittgenstein, 2005, §101, p. 347[e])

> For the form of expression "the appearance of this tree" incorporates the idea that there is a necessary connection between what we call this appearance and the "existence of a tree", a connection made either by a true perception or a mistake. That is, if we're talking about the "appearance of a tree", then either we take something for a tree that is one, or something that isn't one. But there is no such connection. (Wittgenstein, 2005, §101, p. 347[e])

This quote shows Wittgenstein's approach to the idealistic problem of appearance/existence. He says that this phrase, 'appearance of a tree,' is a representation of sense-datum in language, and this is one among other possible representations and is not the essential one. What is dangerous, is that this phrase leads to the supposition that 'behind' this appearance exists something 'true' that is hidden. But there is no such opposition in reality, only our language leads to such puzzles. Although, 'Most importantly, appearance can be accurate or deceptive. — In one sense, it's also connected to reality *empirically*' (Wittgenstein, 2005, p. 348[e]; italics in the original).

> Idealists would like to reproach language with presenting what is secondary as primary and what is primary as secondary. But that is only the case with these inessential valuations which are independent of cognition ('only' an appearance). Apart from that, ordinary language makes no decision as to what is primary or secondary. We have no reason to accept that the expression 'the appearance of a

tree' represents something which is secondary in relation to the expression 'tree'. The expression 'only an image' goes back to the idea that we can't eat the image of an apple. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 271 and 2005, p. 348[e])

Wittgenstein (2016, p. 20), explained this idea with an example — a 'photo may represent distribution of light & dark shades; but it must have light & dark to represent at all.'

N.B. photo does not portray light & darkness; because light & dark are themselves in it. Some features in a picture must represent features in reality, some must be the same. Colour is both in the picture & in what is pictured. (2016, p. 20, emphasis in the original)

At the same time, some remarks on religious feeling, illumination of human life, and senselessness of human life without such supreme illumination leave room for controversy and debates (Wittgenstein, 2003, p. 207). I would say that Wittgenstein was neither an idealist nor a Platonist. Our world, for Wittgenstein, is never a shadow of a higher reality. His inexpressible *mystical* lies together with *speakable* in one world.

Wittgenstein (1998, §7, p. 55) again emphasized the limits of language: 'You cannot use language to go beyond the possibility of evidence.' He repeats (2005, p. 207[e]), 'In language, one cannot transcend the possibility of evidence. What it really means is: The possibility of evidence for a proposition is a matter of grammar.' He again remarks:

Questions of different kinds occupy us. For instance, "What is the specific weight of this body?", "Will the weather stay nice today?", "Who will come through the door next?", etc. But among our questions, there are those of a special kind. Here we have a different experience. These questions seem to be more fundamental than the others. And now I say: When we have this experience, we have arrived at the limits of language. (2005, p. 304[e])

Further, he continued this clarification, 'When I say: Here we are at the limits of language, that always sounds as if resignation were necessary at this point, whereas on the contrary complete satisfaction comes about, since no question remains.' (2005, p. 310[e])

'Philosophy unravels the knots in our thinking; hence its result must be simple, but its activity as complicated as the knots it unravels' (2005, §90, p. 311^e), hence, 'The problems are solved in the literal sense of the word — dissolved like a lump of sugar in water' (p. 310^e).

Grammar as a key to reality

Wittgenstein (1998, §32, p. 70) questioned: 'Where does the sign link up with the world?' In the notes collected by Waismann in Notebook I (Wittgenstein & Waismann, 2003, p. 217), a small three-paged chapter is entitled 'The connection of language with reality'. There, Wittgenstein argued: 'One sees most clearly that there is no fundamental connection between language and reality as one naively imagines there to be if one uses a quite different kind of language, namely a gesture language.' He continued, suggesting that 'the idea of the connection between language and reality comes above all from the use of ostensive definitions, hence from expressions such as: that → is an apple or: I call this → activity eating.' However, 'ostensive explanation is the characteristic of a *specific kind* of language, not of every kind of language' (2003, p. 207, italics in the original). Here Wittgenstein comes up with the idea 'that we do not at all connect language with reality, but that we only connect signs with other signs' (Wittgenstein & Waismann, 2003, p. 221). It means that we 'connect words with samples.' For example, if I say 'apple' and point to an apple with a pointing gesture, first, 'what I point to is not at all the kind apple, but rather only a sample of this kind'; second, 'instead of an actual apple I could just as well have used a drawn apple' (2003, p. 221). Further, Wittgenstein added to his reasoning the following: '\For\ the red object to which I point in ostensively defining the word 'red' is not a described object but a sample, a part of the language. In the future, it will serve me as an object of comparison, just like the standard meter, which is a paradigm and not a measured object.' (Wittgenstein & Waismann, 2003, p. 227)

In (1974/1980) Wittgenstein added the description of the problematics of using an ostensive definition: 'This problem is connected with the fact that in an ostensive definition, I do not state anything about the paradigm (sample); I only use it to make a statement.' For Wittgenstein, an ostensive definition 'belongs to the preparation of language\ and not to its

application' (p. 346). An ostensive definition is itself a part of symbolism, 'it belongs to the symbolism' (p. 346), so it cannot be an object to which we can apply symbolism.

Wittgenstein specified that 'formal', namely, agreed properties of 'red' 'is nothing other than what constitutes grammar' (Wittgenstein & Waismann, 2003, pp. 227, 229). He concludes that 'in the end we only compare objects with signs' (p. 229). In its turn, such an object of comparison, for example, an image, application of 'the colour-scale like a measuring-rod to reality' is only a model, 'nothing more than a means of perspicuous representation' (p. 237). In the *Yellow Book* (Wittgenstein, 2001, §13, p. 65) he wrote, 'the grammar of the one word must conform to the *grammar* of the other, not to a phenomenon.' He continued, 'We have the idea that we are putting up a standard of usage in a nature, but in fact we are only putting up a standard of usage in grammar.' (p. 65) The most important point is that 'the rules of grammar are independent of the facts we describe in our language' (Wittgenstein, 2001, §14). 'We cannot say of a grammatical rule that it conforms to or contradicts a fact. […] To say that a grammatical rule is independent of facts is merely to remind us of something we might forget. And the point of remarking it is to warn us against a peculiar misunderstanding.' (Wittgenstein, 2001, §14, p. 65)

However, even in *Philosophical Grammar*, (Wittgenstein, 1974/1980) Wittgenstein changed his view on this problem a little. He emphasized (1974/1980, §55, p. 15), 'The connection between "language and reality" is made by definitions of words — which belong to grammar.' 'Grammar is not accountable to any reality. It is grammatical rules that determine meaning (constitute it) and so they themselves are not answerable to any meaning and to that extent are arbitrary' (1974/1980, §133, p. 184). In §45 he wrote: '45 The ostensive definition of signs is not an *application* of language, but part of the grammar: something like a rule for translation from a gesture language into a word-language. What belongs to grammar are all the conditions necessary for comparing the proposition with reality — all the conditions necessary for its sense' (p. 13). Wittgenstein (2016) added: 'Grammar is, in a sense, a portrait of reality; but not like a picture of a man.' (p. 51) Further, Wittgenstein expressed the most important ideas:

- 'A word has only meaning in a grammatical system.'

- 'Every proposition has to be understood as part of a system, & grammar describes system.' (2016, pp. 90–91).

- 'Grammar describes the use of words in language' (1974/1980, p. 60).

- 'The rules define or constitute the meaning' (2016, p. 180).

- 'Grammar is the description of language' (2005, p. 146^e).

- Grammatical rules are rules for the use of words (2005, p. 147^e).

- Without grammar it is no language (2005, p. 147^e).

- 'The grammar of a language as a *generally recognized institution is* a set of traffic rules' (2005, p. 147^e, italics in the original).

- 'One can say that grammatical rules describe the structure of language; describe its possibilities' (2005, p. 149^e).

- The use of a word in a special way is not essential to language, it 'is just a practical arrangement' (2005, p. 149^e).

- 'The connection between "language and reality" is made by definitions of words — which belong to grammar' (1974/1980, §55, p. 15).

However, grammar itself for us is pure calculus, 'not the application of calculus to reality' (1974/1980, p. 312). He clarified this complicated case with an example:

> […] while the 3-dimensional calculus was only a game, there weren't yet three dimensions in reality because the x, y, z belonged to the rules only because I had so decided; but now that we have linked them up to the real 3 dimensions, no other movements are *possible* for them. (1974/1980, p. 313, italics in the original)

> Grammatical rules are not those (it goes without saying: empirical) rules in accordance with which language has to be constructed to fulfil its purpose. In order to have a particular effect. Rather they are the description of how language does it — whatever it does. That is, grammar doesn't describe the way language takes effect but only the game of language, the linguistic actions. (2005*,* p. 145^e)

So, grammar itself is a calculus and 'remains a free-floating calculus', it can be extended but cannot be supported, for example, by an appeal to reality, instead the

connection of language with reality is made by ostensive and other definitions and cannot anyway justify grammar (1974/1980, p. 313). Connection with reality extends language (1974/1980, p. 314). If, for instance, in logic, we discuss different universes, it merely means that in reality, we play different language-games. In logic, it would look like (1974/1980, p. 314):

$$(\exists x).\varphi x \underset{=}{Def} \varphi a \vee \varphi b \vee \varphi c \vee \varphi d.$$

If we consider geometry, it comes out to be that applied geometry 'is the grammar of statements about spatial objects' (Wittgenstein, 1974/1980, p. 319). The same is true with numbers, if we want to understand what numerals signify, our investigation means that we investigate the grammar of language (1974/1980, p. 321). We even do not look for a definition of the word 'number' or 'numeral' but look for an *exposition* of the grammar of these words. For Wittgenstein, 'one calculus is as good as another' (1974/1980, p. 334). 'To look down on a particular calculus is like wanting to play chess without real pieces, because playing with pieces is too particularized and not abstract enough. If the pieces really don't matter then one lot is just as good as another' (1974/1980, p. 334). None of the games is more sublime than another, they are all on the same level, and we cannot distinguish any more 'correct' game (1974/1980, p. 334). Moreover, in our ordinary language, we are used to the usage of numerals as 'attributes of concept-words. However, different concept-words belong to 'different grammatical systems', so that grammatically they are distinct from each other. In this case, in our world-language '($\ni x$, y …) etc.' notation means the expression 'there is …', 'which is a form of expression into which countless grammatical forms are squeezed' (1974/1980, p. 345). We can note similar misunderstandings with the expressions of the type 'same number', 'same colour', 'same length', etc., all these expressions have grammars that look similar but are not the same (1974/1980, p. 353). We can extend the problematics by saying that each of these words, moreover, has several different meanings, and, so, they can be replaced by other words with different grammar. For instance,

> For "same number" does not mean the same when applied to lines simultaneously present in the visual field as in connection with the apples in two boxes; and "same length" applied in visual space is different from "same length" in Euclidean space;

and the meaning of "same colour" depends on the criterion we adopt for sameness of colour. (1974/1980, p. 353)

Wittgenstein (1998, p. 1) continued, 'The signs themselves only contain the possibility and not the reality of their repetition.' Further, he argued:

A system is, so to speak, a world.

Therefore, we can't search for a system: What we *can* search for is the expression for a system that is given me in unwritten symbols.

The system of rules determining a calculus thereby determines the 'meaning' of its signs too. Put more strictly: The form and the rules of syntax are equivalent. So, if I change the rules — seemingly supplement them, say — then I change the form, the meaning. (1998, p. 178; italics in the original)

In May 1930 Wittgenstein (2016) claimed: 'Most of our sentences are hypotheses.' (p. 44) And propositions such as '"This is a piece of chalk" expresses a series of expectations.' Discussing the term 'expectation' *in Zettel*, Wittgenstein came to what reality *is not*:

60. Reality is not a property still missing in what is expected and which accedes to it when one's expectation comes about. — Nor is reality like the daylight that things need to acquire colour, when they are already there, as it were with colourless, in the dark. (Wittgenstein, 1967, p. 13^e and 2005, p. 268^e)

Among the important phenomena for Wittgenstein, was the phenomenon of *expectation*. Expectation is a special intention expressed by and in language, as well as the phenomenon of memory (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 73). He dedicated many passages in his papers describing what an expectation is. First, the common to expectation and reality is the reference to another point in the *same* space (Wittgenstein,1998, p. 70). Second, expectation presupposes *preparedness* — 'I *prepare* myself for red' (1998, p. 71; emphasis in the original). Hence, 'our expectation anticipates the event', 'it makes a model of this event' (1978, p. 71). 'But we can only make a model of a fact in *the* world we live in, i.e., the model

must be essentially related to the world we live in and what's more, independently of whether it's true or false' (1998, p.71.). Here he highlights 'the' of the world, i.e., exists only one world, only one reality (in Wittgenstein's texts world and reality usually come as synonyms). The two most important characteristics of an expectation are *intention* and *directing of one's attention* (1998, § 35, p. 71). In expectation we know that it is an expectation; 'And that is what shows that expectation is immediately connected with reality' (1998, p. 72). 'For my expecting is just as real as my *waiting*' (Wittgenstein, 2005, p. 171^e; italics in the original). The future an expectation speaks of is not a surrogate of the real future, but it can become true or false in correspondence to reality.

> What's essential is that I must be able to compare my expectation not only with what is to be regarded as its definitive answer (its verification or falsification), but also with how things stand at present. This alone makes the expectation into a picture. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 286)

> We expect something and act in accordance with our expectation. Does the expectation have to come about? — No. So why do we act in accordance with an expectation? Because we are driven to do this as we are driven to dodge a car, to sit down when we're tired and to jump up when we've sat on a thorn. (Wittgenstein, 2005, p. 180^e)

Finally, it is *in language* where expectation and event make contact. (Wittgenstein, 2005, §79, p. 275^e) 'Expectation is a preparatory action. A preparatory action within language (calculation of the boiler). Expectation is a preparation for something, a preparation within language' (2005, p. 286^e). In *MWL* (Wittgenstein, 2016, p. 14) he added: 'All the conditions that must be fulfilled in order that a proposition should be compared with reality, are rules of the application of language.' 'By application I understand what makes the combination of sounds or marks into a language at all. In the sense that it is the application which makes the rod with marks on it into a *measuring rod*: *putting* language *up against* reality' (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 85) Once again, we return to the grammar of language as the fundamental condition of our use of language and, at the same time, our comprehension.

Wittgenstein argued (p. 16), 'The multiplicity which language must have, is supplied by rules of grammar.' Although 'language must have same degree of freedom,' its grammar fixes a certain degree. For example, 'grammar should not allow to say "greenish-red"' (1998, p. 16).

> Thus, rules give to symbolism a certain particular degree of freedom.
>
> Degree of freedom is expressed by what I call rules of its grammar.
>
> Explaining how to use a symbolism, increases multiplicity of symbolism, by distinguishing different ways of interpreting: it excludes certain interpretations. (Wittgenstein, 2016, p. 99, emphasis in the original)

Wittgenstein used his favorite method of visual representation saying, 'the proposition is applied to reality like a foot-rule to a table: it "reaches up to" reality' (2016, p. 152). Rules bear constitutional function, 'Rather, the rules about kinds of words constitute them: the same rules, the same type of word' (Wittgenstein, 2005, p. 206^e). In fact, 'The respect that one has for the rules (e.g. of chess), why — in a manner of speaking — we don't question their authority, comes from the fact that the games they describe are suited to us in many different respects' (2005, p. 193^e). Rules are necessarily connected with acceptance or non-acceptance. 'I present a rule to someone who is confused, and he accepts it. I could also say: I present him with a notation' (2005, p. 191^e).

For Wittgenstein, it is definitely that language refers to the world. In the *PR* (Wittgenstein, 1998) he writes, '47 It doesn't strike us at all when we look round us, move about in space, feel our own bodies, etc., etc., because there is nothing that contrasts with the form of our world. The self-evidence of the world expresses itself in the very fact that language can and does only refer to it.' (1998, p. 14) In *BT* (2005, p. 315^e) he again says about the *self-evidence* of all given, of *life*, 'The self-evidence of the world is expressed in the very fact that language signifies only it and can only signify it.'

Wittgenstein claimed, '*Anything that can be described can happen*' (2001, p. 166, italics in the original). It means that anything that can be described consciously *in language* expressed in words obtains physical and/or logical possibility to happen in reality. If I describe

a dragon, it really exists in paintings, myths, and fairy tales. However, not all propositions say something about reality. Wittgenstein gave an example (2001, p. 171): we have two rows of dots, three on the left and four on the right, and then we make propositions describing the relationship between these rows.

1) 'These sets of dots do not fall into pairs.' — *empirical proposition*;
2) 'Three dots cannot fall into pairs with four dots.' — *arithmetical proposition*;
3) '4 dots do not fall in pairs with 3 dots' — *timeless proposition*;
4) 'Anything that looks like this (image of 3 dots in a row) cannot fall into pairs with anything that looks like this (image of 4 dots in a row)' — *proposition about reality*;
5) 'Visual image *p* (the pentagram) fits visual image *P* (the pentagon)' — *proposition of geometry* (*i.e., of grammar*) (Wittgenstein, 2001, p. 176; italics in the original).

For Wittgenstein, an *a priori* 'harmony between thought and reality' is a confusion that leads people to mistakes (Wittgenstein, 2016, p. 89). In *PI* (2009, §429) he clarified, '429. The agreement, the harmony, between thought and reality consists in this, that if I say falsely that something is red, then all the same, it is red that it isn't. And in this, that if I want to explain the word 'red' to someone, in the sentence 'That is not red', I do so by pointing to something that is red' (2009, p. 135^e).

In *Zettel* Wittgenstein wrote clearly, 'Like everything metaphysical the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of language' (Wittgenstein, 1967, §55, p. 12^e, and 1974/1980, §112, p. 162). The same was repeated in *BT* (Wittgenstein, 2005, p. 141^e): 'Like everything metaphysical the (pre-established) harmony between thoughts and reality is to be discovered in the grammar of language.' There is an 'agreement of thought and reality' (2005, p. 141^e). Here we can replace 'agreement' with 'pictoriality', but pictoriality is not just an agreement of form. Wittgenstein says that it was a misleading idea of *Tractatus*. 'Anything can be a picture of anything' and 'any projection has to *have* something *in common* with what is projected' (2005, p. 141^e). 'The picture and what it represents have their method of projection in common, so to speak' (2005, p. 142^e). He added that sometimes the *method of projection* really takes place, and we deal with an agreement or a disagreement between proposition and reality, but this method is not the only

one. The second one is the *method of application*, which is 'our having learnt to apply the signs in a particular way' (Wittgenstein, 1974/1980, p. 213). A projective description is not that 'reality is ironed out by the lines of projection belonging to the picture' but in its case is merely a description. Appealing to grammar we establish a relationship between description and reality. In the *PR* (1998, p. 282) we meet: '225 A proposition, an hypothesis, is coupled with reality — with varying degrees of freedom. In the limit case, there's no longer any connection, reality can do anything it likes without coming into conflict with the proposition: in which case the proposition (hypothesis) is senseless!' 'The agreement of a proposition with reality only resembles the agreement of a picture with what it depicts to the same extent as the agreement of a memory image with the present object' (1998, §19, p. 61). For example,

This figure in the picture is I" is an agreement.

Fine, but about what are we agreeing? What relation are we establishing between signs and myself? Well, nothing other than the one that exists, say, by pointing with one's hand or attaching a label. For this relation is only meaningful because of the system to which it belongs (Wittgenstein, 2005, p. 227[e]).

To repeat, for Wittgenstein, do not exist any metaphysical *a priori* presuppositions about the relationship between language and reality — the only key is grammar. 'To rules of translation from language into reality correspond rules of grammar' (Wittgenstein, 2016, p. 106). In *PG* (1974/1980, p. 88) Wittgenstein states, 'What belongs to grammar are all the conditions (the method) necessary for comparing the proposition with reality. That is, all the conditions necessary for the understanding (of the sense).' 'Grammar says which combinations of symbols are allowed, which not = which make sense, which don't' (Wittgenstein, 2016, p. 109). 'What corresponds to a necessity in the world must be what in language seems an arbitrary rule' (2016, p. 130). 'Grammatical rules are arbitrary, but their application is not arbitrary' (2016, p. 133). They are arbitrary 'in the same sense as the choice of a unit of measurement' (1974/1980, §133, p. 185). It does not mean that one choice is 'true', and another is 'false', as it does not matter whether we measure the length in meters

or feet. Only the statement of length can be true or false. 'For when I say that the rules are arbitrary I mean that they are not determined by reality, as is the description of this reality. And that means: It is nonsense to say of them that they correspond to reality; that, say, the rules for the words "blue" and "red" agree with the facts about those colours, etc.' (Wittgenstein, 2005, p. 232^e). However, in *BT* (2005, p. 45^e) Wittgenstein emphasized that it is important to distinguish between 'Rules of grammar that establish a "connection between language and reality", and those that don't.' 'I call this colour "red" is an example of the first kind, for instance — "~~p = p" is of the second. But there's a misconception about this difference: the difference seems to be one of principle; and language seems to be something that is given a structure and then superimposed on reality' (2005, p. 232^e). In *BT* §43 (2005, p. 141^e) Wittgenstein says clearly: 'The connection between "language and reality" is made through explanations of words, which explanations belong in turn to grammar. So that language remains self-contained, autonomous.' The translation of this passage in *PG* (1974/1980, §55, p. 97) differs: 'The connection between "language and reality" is made by definitions of words, and these belong to grammar, so that language remains self-contained and autonomous.' Certainly, for Wittgenstein, it is more relevant to use the word 'definition' than 'explanation'. However, if we look for the German original word, it was *Erklärung*. In English, this word is usually translated as 'explanation' and never as 'definition'. Yet, the literal translation would better read as the 'clarification of words.' In other words, the prefix 'er' here means to get into a state (to become) that is conveyed by a semantic verb to which this prefix is added, here we have 'er' – 'klären', so the final word 'Erklärung' as a noun derived from a verb does not mean exactly the process of clarification, but the final state. On p. 166^e in *BT* (Wittgenstein, 2005) and in *CV* (1980), Wittgenstein added:

> If one asks "How does a sentence go about representing?", the answer could be: "Do you (really) not know this? After all, you see it when you use one". For nothing is concealed.
>
> How does a sentence do that? — Do you really not know this? After all, nothing is hidden.

> Things are placed right in from of our eyes, not covered by any veil. (Wittgenstein, 1980, p. 6ᵉ)

Wittgenstein asserts: 'For no image, not even a hallucination, can bridge the gap between image and reality, and no one image is better at this than another' (Wittgenstein, 2005, p. 228ᵉ). He added, 'You can't get behind the rules, because there isn't any "behind"' (2005, p. 231ᵉ). In other words, the 'grammatical rules', i.e., the semantic and logical rules that constitute language are 'autonomous', they do not have to mirror the structure of reality. There is nothing in reality that can be directly mirrored by 'Ah', 'Oops', 'Second', 'Go!', 'Good luck'; we can only explain the application of these expressions in a specific context, in practice. Rules of grammar are not something 'hidden' that should be discovered by logicians, they are on the surface, we can see everything in the use of language. Rules of grammar determine meaning (constitute it) (2005, §56, 184ᵉ; my emphasis); 'it is *all* its rules that characterize a game, a language, and that these rules are not answerable to a reality in the sense that they are controlled by it, and that we could have doubts whether a particular rule is necessary or correct' (2005, §56, 184ᵉ, italics in the original).

In the notes of conversations with Wittgenstein recorded by Waismann (Wittgenstein & Waismann, 2003, p. 139), we can find the following important quote: '[…] geometry does not talk about cubes, but it constitutes the meaning of the word "cube"'. However, rules are not contained in a figure, 'it rather depends on our *conception* of the figure' (2003, p. 139, italics in the original). That is, we do not extract anything from the figure, but here the figure itself is a part of the symbolism, namely of an especially simple form of symbolism, and in this sense, one can say that the 'model of a cube *guides* us in setting up geometrical rules.'

> If one wanted to string together words totally at one's pleasure, then very often no sense would emerge. In response to the question what is the reason for this, the answer familiar to everybody is: the meaning of the words. Only if the words are joined in accordance with their senses does a thought result. (Wittgenstein & Waismann, 2003, p. 137)

In the *Philosophy of Psychology* (Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 223[e]) Wittgenstein expressed this idea briefly: 'Let the use teach you the meaning.' In *BT* Wittgenstein argues, 'Grammar is not answerable to any reality. (Grammar is not accountable to reality)' (Wittgenstein, 2005, §56, p. 184[e]). 'Thus, these rules are arbitrary, because it is the rules that first give meaning to the sign' (2005, p. 185[e]). At the same time, 'the justification that is inherent *in* grammar as such doesn't exist *for* grammar' (2005, p. 185[e], emphasis in the original). And (2005, p. 186[e]) 'The rules of grammar are arbitrary and not arbitrary, in the same sense as is the choice of a unit of measurement. This is also expressed by saying that these rules are "practical" or "impractical", "useful" or "useless", but not "true" or "false"'. Likewise, when choosing a unit of measurement, we can choose between rules. After being chosen, the rules become arbitrary to follow, that is:

> to say that the rules of grammar are arbitrary just means: Don't confuse a rule for the use of the word A with a sentence in which the word A is used. Don't think that a rule is answerable to a reality, is comparable to a reality, in more or less the way an empirical proposition about A is' (2005, p. 186[e]).

> The rules of grammar can be compared to rules for procedures to measure periods of time, distances, temperatures, forces, etc, etc. Or: these methodological rules are themselves examples of grammatical rules. We'll profit by comparing grammatical rules to agreements (2005, p. 186[e]).

For example, if we want to express a negation with a sign, we need to obey special rules, this expression must conform to rules (2005, p. 187[e]). However, playing language-games, speaking a language is not defined by its finality like other actions, so if one is guided by other rules, it means that this person plays a different game. It does not mean that this person is saying anything false, 'but is talking about something else' (2005, p. 187[e]). Wittgenstein said: "Words like 'truth', 'sense', 'reality' have a peculiar fascination. The philosopher would like to penetrate to the deeper meaning which he dimly feels to lie behind these words" (Wittgenstein & Waismann, 2003, p. 487). He continued (2003., p. 491): 'The question 'What is truth?' always has a certain aura in logic. One imagines that the answer to

it must give us information about the relation of thought to reality.' In *BT* (Wittgenstein, 2005, p. 181[e]) Wittgenstein explained, 'So long as we stay within the realm of True–False games, all that a change in grammar can do is to lead us from *one* such game to *another*, not from something true to something false.' He added that it is what is the most difficult to understand and accept. We play True-False language-games within the realm of grammar, if we change something so that it becomes true or false, it means that we just switch to another language-game. When we step outside of these games, it means that we step outside grammar. However, even in this case 'we don't get to the point of contradicting reality' (2005, p. 181[e]).

The 'truth' is one of the most difficult topics in Wittgenstein because he distinguishes True-False as language-games that are 'conventional' and Truth as non 'conventional.' Nevertheless, Wittgenstein's understanding of convention is not simple, 'By a convention I mean that the use of a sign is in accordance with language habits and training' (Wittgenstein, 2001, p. 89). A convention is not a regulation for representing something that can be justified by propositions that describe a representation and show if this representation is adequate (Wittgenstein, 2005, p. 188[e]). Wittgenstein claims that grammatical conventions cannot be 'justified by a description of what is represented' (2005, p. 188[e]). Convention here is not an agreement between people or a person and a social structure, but an agreement of a person to follow the rules of a language-game. Thus, language grammar conditions human interaction with reality. The main two cases that led to misunderstandings and philosophical troubles are (not in all languages):

1) Taking a substantive to stand for a thing or substance.
2) Anthropomorphism of objects and entities.
3) As a combination of these two points: personification of things/ substances.

These reasons cause most part of metaphysical problems, for example, when we try to speak about 'God' as a personalized gender-specific being, similar to the human physical body, when we try to imagine the 'soul' as a 'gaseous' entity, etc. Indeed, there are other peculiarities, that Wittgenstein emphasized:

- psychologization of problems that are really grammatical;
- unthinkability of the infinite;

- inexpressibility of personal experience;

- misleading metaphors as 'time flows';

- use of explanation instead of required descriptions;

- extrapolation of scientific models and rules on humanities;

- taking hypotheses as arbitrary statements;

- representation of memory as a storage;

- representation of thinking as located in the mind (the mind is a model).

On the *intersubjective* level, human beings arrange agreements on the certain use of concrete words and the contexts of their application. All these agreements led to the agreement in the *form of life* and *seeing* a certain *picture of the world.* This agreement hides underneath the deep sociological meaning as any other social agreement (*as-if* conventions and *contrat sociale* [*sic*], Wittgenstein, 2005, p. 151^e), when we agree on language-games and their rules, we give away our freedom to use words in other ways — the freedom to create new senses and meanings. In *OC* Wittgenstein (1969, §455, p. 59^e) wrote, 'Every language-game is based on words "and objects" being recognized again. We learn with the same inexorability that this is a chair as 2 × 2 = 4.' On this level, humans arrange rules for the use of propositions. If we are interested in the agreement of these propositions with an idea (not natural phenomena), then 'the propositions asserting such ideas are rules' (Wittgenstein, 2001, p. 86). This means that 'the rules do not *follow from* the idea', the rules '*constitute*' the idea (2001, p. 86, italics in the original). The rules 'show the rules of the word' (p. 86). Moreover, in other words, 'The rules are not something contained in the idea and got by analyzing it. They constitute it.' […] The rules constitute the "freedom" of the pieces (p.86.). An idea is only a means of operating with language, 'and in all sorts of different ways' (p.86.). 'As soon as we see that this use is only one of lots of uses, we see that the idea plays the role of a symbol' (p.86.).

Condé wrote (2022, p. 10), 'I thus argue that the notions of language-games, grammar and form of life constitute the framework of our habits, customs and institutions (Wittgenstein, 2008, §§ 142, pp. 199, 202, 226, 227), establishing therein the contingency of knowledge and the historicity of a form of life.' In Wittgenstein's words, 'shared human behaviour is the

system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language' (Wittgenstein, 2009, §206).

Language as a vehicle of thought and *principium cognoscendi*

Wittgenstein never considered language in a vacuum. Language does not mean any particular language or exceptionally a word-language. Language is 'languages', and languages themselves are systems. 'It is units of languages that I call "propositions"' (Wittgenstein, 1974/1980, §122, p. 27). 'What I call a "proposition" is a position in the game of language' (§124). 'Everything is carried out *in language*' (Wittgenstein, 2005, p. 279ᵉ). 'Everything is brought to the common denominator of language and compared there' (2005, p. 283ᵉ). With language we describe reality and then we learn from the propositions, 'from the description of reality, how things are in reality' (2005, p. 277ᵉ). We communicate with everything around us through descriptions in our language. These descriptions constitute our worldview. Descriptions may change, which entails a change in our picture of the world. Therefore, language is not a kind of lens through which we comprehend the outer reality, language is a part of the world we live in, it is a part of our common reality.

Our concepts are, indeed, descriptions. Later Wittgenstein did not accept any metaphysical essence of a thing. Normally, people explain generality with examples. However, 'examples that are supposed to exhibit only certain traits' (2005, p. 252ᵉ) and a nothing more than a technical aid (p. 252ᵉ). And seeing something in common is not the understanding of the concept (p. 252ᵉ). In fact, 'There is no detour to make what is said about an enumeration of individual cases into an explanation of generality' (2005, p. 265ᵉ). We, human beings, live in 'our conceptual [*Begriffswelt*] world' (Wittgenstein, 1969, §568). 'I see a concept of an […] before my mind's eye' (Wittgenstein, 2005, p. 252ᵉ). Wittgenstein says in '*On Aesthetics'* that the 'essential nature of mind', it is the 'concept formation' (Wittgenstein, 1967, p. 45). A concept itself is constituted of the things which are called by the name of this concept at present. For instance, 'it is only the things at present called numbers that constitute the concept "number"' (Wittgenstein, 1974/1980, p. 300). The concept of tables is constituted of table objects. Here it is interesting that Wittgenstein talks about the things at present, I suppose it is connected with his understanding of time while

here we do not deal with physical time but with the present as now and past as present for us — a grammatical time (also, expectation and imagining something in the future happens now in present).

The distinctive feature of human beings is an ability to use language. I suppose Wittgenstein could agree with Heidegger that human beings speak language because it is natural to us. 'It does not first arise out of some special volition. Man is said to have language by nature. It is held that man, in distinction from plant and animal, is the living being capable of speech' (Heidegger, 2001, p. 187). The world without language is a world of senses, feelings, and perceptions. By means of language, humans express and explain their perceptions and experiences, and share them with others, i.e., 'both the report and the exclamation, are expressions of perception and of visual experience' (Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 207^e). '[…] since the exclamation is the description of a perception, one can also call it the expression of thought. — Someone who looks at an object need not think of it; but whoever has the visual experience expressed by the exclamation is also thinking of what he sees.' (Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 207^e). When I express my perception, the problem is, if it was a *seeing* or a thought. Wittgenstein even said, '188. Don't try to analyse the experience within yourself' (Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 215^e).

Wittgenstein emphasized the inextricable relationship between language and life. 'To study language apart from the sort of importance it has in the circumstances in which it is learnt, the sort of importance it has in living, is to take a false view of it' (in Citron 2015, pp. 17–18). In *CV* Wittgenstein said, citing Goethe (*Faust*, Part I), 'The origin and the primitive form of the language-game is a reaction only from this can more complicated forms develop. Language — I want to say — is a refinement, "in the beginning was the deed"' (Wittgenstein, 1980, p. 31^e). With the help of language, a sensory phenomenon is transformed into an act of meaning, thus, a sensory phenomenon becomes fixed in the forms of thought, word, and language. First, appears perception, then its comprehension, which is impossible without language. The 'objectivity' (consists of 'objects') of consciousness is initially a primary pre-semantic structure in relation to its semantic side, to the procedures of giving meanings, comprehension, and understanding. This is how the process of the comprehension of the world by human beings proceeds. Meanings do not exist outside of human consciousness;

meanings are set by human beings with the help of language (meaning for us). According to Wittgenstein, most of the meanings are conventional, but he singles out the so-called higher (existential) meaning, which 'illuminates' human life. In the *Yellow book* (Wittgenstein, 2001, p. 43), he said that a sentence is dead until it is understood, without understanding, it is just 'ink on paper'; 'it has meaning only for the understanding being.' He added (p.43), 'If there were no one to understand the signs we would not call the signs language.'

Language is not just a representation of culture but *is* culture itself, an expression of human mental activity. We interact with the world, give meaning to things and processes, and change the world with the help of language. Science, culture, religion, and other forms of human activity are impossible without language. It is the language that distinguishes a human form of being from an animal, which is not able to give meaning to a phenomenon and get to know oneself through the act of self-reflection. Language is what makes a human being truly human. In the words of a philosopher of consciousness and language (founder of hermeneutical phenomenology), Gustav Shpet (see Flack, 2013, p. 122), a word is *principium cognoscendi* (Shpet, 1917/1994, p. 294) of human consciousness. Analyzing our consciousness, we cannot fail to notice that the 'word' occupies a special layer. While we are simply living, our experiences flow one after another, among them there are 'verbal experiences', but they take their place next to others, they also appear and go away, and their universal significance is hardly noticeable. But it is worth stopping at anything for its knowledge, and it becomes immediately imprinted by a word. From now on, we will know it in a verbal form. Human beings cannot leave our linguistic boundaries, even if we want to. This would be equal to making an attempt to go beyond existence, which is completely covered by language and represented in it since the world for humans is in language. We cannot imagine the way of interacting with the world (and our self-inner world) without language. It is the most difficult exercise in different religious practices to clear one's mind of thoughts, of comprehension with the help of language and its habitual 'forms'. These forms are not *a priori*, they are learnt while growing up and they correspond to our way of thinking and our 'mode of perception' (*die Art der Wahrnehmung*) (Wittgenstein, 2005, pp. 315–315e).[1] Even if I accidentally cast a glance at an object, then I instantly scan it, practically without thinking about it, it happens *spontaneously* in a certain background mode of

consciousness. In *PG* Wittgenstein described the process of application of a concept in ordinary life. Wittgenstein wonders: 'Why does my thought strike me as such an exceptional piece of reality?'; (Wittgenstein, 1974/1980, p. 273) further, his answer is: 'Rather, obviously because I use thought to find out everything; even concerning thinking, all I can do is to think' (Wittgenstein, 2005, p. 283e).

Language, for the late Wittgenstein, after his anthropological turn, acquires a figurative and symbolic character. Signs exist only for living beings (not only humans) (Wittgenstein, 1974/1980, § 139).[2] Language-games describe this character of language. Now we do not need to purify language, otherwise, it becomes artificial (the cases of formal language or universal language) and has nothing in common with the real ordinary language. Through understanding of language-games, their grammar, and how they function, we can again return metaphors, poetics, and other figurative elements to our analysis and not just eliminate them as an inaccurate use of words. All these elements now again have the right to exist. Wittgenstein shows that some of them are 'literally' embedded into our language (and the way of thinking), and some are historically conventional. Agreement in the meanings of the words and appropriate situations to use them is not only an agreement in language but in the *way of life*, i.e., in the way we see the world, how we interact with it, how we behave and act. Moreover, this *agreement* is impossible without preliminary *acceptance* of a certain picture. 'My *life* consists in my being content to accept many things' (Wittgenstein, 1969, §344, p. 44e). This *acceptance* or *non-acceptance* changes the human *way of seeing* (Wittgenstein, 1967, p. 82e). Moreover, if language and the way of thinking in language are interlocked with the ways of life or forms of life, then, language illuminates the diseases of human forms of life. In the words of von Wright, 'if philosophical problems are symptomatic of language producing malignant outgrowths which obscure our thinking, then there must be a cancer in the *Lebensweise*, in the way of life itself' (von Wrigth, 1982, p. 118). Cavell (1989, p. 52), in this case, called Wittgenstein a 'philosopher — even critic — of culture'. Wittgenstein, however, acknowledged that 'in philosophizing we may not *terminate* a disease of thought. It must run its natural course, and *slow* cure is all important' (Wittgenstein, 1966/1967, p. 69e).

Conclusion

Language neither reflects nor mirrors reality. Language is not a 'frozen', fixed structure; on the contrary, it is a living organism that constantly develops. One of its great functions is the manifestation of the creative capacity of the human mind. The 'pre-established harmony between world and thought' consists in the *space of language* (Wittgenstein, 2005, p. 281e)*.* Rules of grammar are not hidden; we do not need to construct an artificial language or try to find logical forms, to reveal the 'bewitchment of our understanding', we need to describe different linguistic practices that constitute a variety of language-games embedded in our form of life. What grammar does — describes meanings of words. However, 'Human beings are deeply imbedded in philosophical, i.e. grammatical, confusions' (2005, §90, p. 311e). Language-games show and describe various relations between human beings and the world. When we try to describe language not as a *thing-in-itself* but as a living organism, as an activity of the human mind interwoven in the whole human *lifeworld*, we engage with the world around us. '[…] the bridge between sign and reality […] *can* only be crossed when we get there' (2005, p. 278e).

Crossing this bridge, we move towards reality. 'The continuity of the calculus within me' gives the picture its meaning. 'I behave towards the picture in a similar way as towards reality, and the calculus within me — the thought process — occurs as one take on it, or as a continuous series of takes. That is to say, I experience the picture in its way as I do reality in its way' (2005, p. 288e). 'Our attitude towards the picture, that we have an experience of the picture, turns it into reality for us. That is, it connects it to reality by establishing a continuity' (p. 288e). '[…] only our attitude towards the picture can turn it into a reality for us.' (2005, p. 288e) Our *attitude* (and the way we experience) to a picture, to a thought 'makes it real for us' — 'connects it with reality', hence, 'it establishes a continuity with reality'. (1974/1980, §132, p. 183) For instance, we see a picture and what is seen makes us feel fear, thus, 'Fear connects a picture with the terrors of reality' (1974/1980, §132, p. 183).[3] For example, the preposition 'It is raining' is an expression of my thought that it is raining, and here my thought is a certain picture expressed in language and with language in the form of a proposition.

It is connected with reality by the attitude of my attention towards a fact in the world. If I cannot see the rain outside directly and someone says to me, 'It is raining now', it means that I get a picture by this proposition spoken in the language. For instance, when I believe or doubt, I also use language. Hence, I really behave towards this picture as towards reality.

'For no phenomenon is particularly mysterious' or important in any other way 'in itself', 'any of them can become so to us' (Wittgenstein, 2018/2020, p. 42). People direct their attention to a phenomenon and intentionally give it importance. For Wittgenstein, this capacity is a distinctive feature of the 'awakening human mind', to create and then see significance in a phenomenon. This is the way of creation of all human socio-cultural life. People create symbols, objects, and gods, give importance to natural objects and phenomena, they create rituals, rites, holidays, celebrations, customs, rules, and meanings. The development of all this manifoldness of the creative capacity of the human mind would be impossible without language. With language, people create new worlds within one common reality.

Language was created by people and depends on people's 'tendency to think' a certain way. Hence, all grammatical confusions appear because of the confusion of human thinking. 'Language [was] not defined for us as an arrangement fulfilling a definite purpose' (1974/1980, §137). So, language has developed naturally as an expression of the human way of thinking. And, thereby, human beings have come up to the interdependence of thinking and language. Language 'itself' has become 'the vehicle of thought' (2005, p. 283e). Indeed, we need words for almost all cognitive processes: believing ('One can believe with words.' (2005, p. 289e), wishing, hoping, searching, doubting, expecting, and fearing (distinguished from a psychological process). Thus, all human life passes in the sphere of language. 'Everything is carried out in language' (2005, p. 283e). For instance, 'Philosophy is not laid down in propositions, but in a language' (2005, 313e). 'Human beings are entangled all unknowing in the net of language' (1974/1980, p. 462). 'What is spoken can only be explained in language, and so in this sense language itself cannot be explained. Language must speak for itself' (1974/1980, p. 40). 'Language cannot express what belongs to the essence of the world' (Was zum Wesen der Welt gehört, kann die Sprache nicht ausdrücken.) (2005, §91, pp. 314–314e).

'In grammar the application of language is also described — what we would like to call the connection between language and reality' (2005, p. 322^e). 'The connection between "language and reality" is made through explanations of words, which explanations belong in turn to grammar' (1974/1980, p. 97). And we connect words and correspondent things 'by the teaching of language' (1974/1980, p. 97), however, it is neither a psychological connection, not just pointing-at. A form of our language corresponds to the 'harmony between reality and thought' (1974/1980, p. 135). '[…] language doesn't have any way of signifying something until it gets it from what it signifies, from the world, no language is conceivable that doesn't represent this world' (2005, p. 315^e). For example, when we say a colour-octahedron — it is grammar, it says that we can talk about a 'reddish blue, but not about a reddish green, etc.' (2005, p. 322^e). And the representation via a form octahedron is a '*surveyable* representation of the grammatical rules' (p. 322^e, italics in the original). E.g., '"being coloured" is contained in the definition of the concept "visual space", i.e. in the grammar of the words "visual space"' (p. 322^e). The geometry of visual space is grammar.

Wittgenstein's idea of philosophy as 'what is present *before* all new discoveries and inventions' lies within the framework of a long tradition of continental philosophy (2005, pp. 309–309^e; italics in the original) — the old idea of philosophy as a foundation of all subsequent knowledge. 'The philosophical problem is an awareness of the disorder in our concepts and can be solved by ordering them' (2005, p. 309^e).

In the *Big Typescript* Wittgenstein states, 'The goal of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language ends anyway' (Wittgenstein, 2005, p. 312^e). Thus, as in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein once again delineates the boundaries of language. If in *TLP* 5.6 Wittgenstein wrote '*The limits of my language* mean the limits of my world', then in the *Big Typescript* he criticizes this approach, 'Again and again there is the attempt to delimit and to display the world in language — but that doesn't work' (Wittgenstein, 2010/1922, p. 74). We should not delimit the *world*; we should find the limits of *language*. Concerning displaying the world in language, we are inclined to make mistakes, for instance, Wittgenstein criticizes those 'who ascribe reality only to things and not to our ideas' (Wittgenstein,2005, p. 315^e). Our ideas and thoughts lie in the same space in reality as things. 'And neither can we *mean*

(think) beyond the reach of our language.[4] (We can't mean more than we can say.)' (Wittgenstein,2005, p. 349ᵉ; emphasis in the original.)

Here, once again, facing the boundaries of *word-language*, Wittgenstein jumps over them recognising that there are *other* languages that can express inexpressible in the word-language; 'if reality is declaring itself via language, it is taking a long way round' (here in the context language means word language) (1974/1980, §114, p. 164). For instance, a picture may 'tell' me words, but it is not essential that words should occur to me. He emphasized explicitly four types of language: word-language, gesture-language, picture-language, and sound-language. All of them are self-sufficient and face great difficulties in translation from one to another, however, the word-language is the *primary* one. Other kinds depend on 'their analogy or comparability to word-language' (2005, p. 155ᵉ).

Notes

[1] 'That we don't notice anything when we look around, look around in space, feel our own bodies, etc., etc., shows how natural these very things are to us. We don't perceive that we see space perspectively, or that our visual image is in some sense blurred towards its edge. We never notice this, and can never notice it, because it is *the* mode of perception. We never think about it, and it is impossible to do so, because there is no opposite to the form of our world' (Wittgenstein, 2005, p. 315ᵉ)

[2] 'It is always for living beings that sign exist.' (Wittgenstein, 1974/1980, §139, p. 30) Zoopsychology and ordinary life practice of the interaction with animals, dog and other animal training clearly show that animals can comprehend and memorise signs to fulfil commands. For a sing we can understand a gesture-sign (as a part of gesture-language) and a sound-sing (as a part of sound-language). Moreover, animals can communicate with each other and humans using sound- and gesture-language.

[3] This Wittgenstein's observation anticipated nowadays cognitive psychology and physiology achievements. For instance, Mathews et al. (2013) argued: (1) 'In two experiments signal detection analysis revealed that mental images were more likely to be confused with viewed pictures than were verbal descriptions'; (2) 'We conclude that mental images are both more emotionally arousing and more likely to be confused with real events than are verbal descriptions, although source accuracy for images varies according to how they are encoded.' 'To elicit emotion in the lab, researchers often use pictures of emotional scenes from standardized databases like the International Affective Picture System' (IAPS; Lang et al., 2008) in (MacNamara et al., 2022). In cognitive neuroscience emotional images are known to evoke an amygdala response (see Ewbank et al., 2009).

[4] The margin remark was — 'more than our language says'.

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