Analítica

Presentación

Francisco Díaz Montilla — 2025-10-27

Virtue epistemology and education

Rashad Rehman Franciscan — 2025-10-27

Education is a bifurcated process by which knowledge is generated and transferred through learning tangible skills and intangible virtues. This paper uses Amartya Sen’s capability approach to advocate for a normative quality of welfare pursuant to the capability of education. For normative welfare, a particular state of consciousness or midfare must first be achieved. We characterize this midfare as Intellect, which is defined by a set of non-exhaustive virtues that we devise and that prioritize the Finnisian value of knowledge over all other subjective pursuits. We also assess a possible relativist critique to Intellect. The desire is that a working model of Intellect will be implemented within transitioning curricula.

Moral responsability in Plato’s philosophy. Commentary on “Timaeus” 86D-87B

Marc Zapata Pedrosa — 2025-10-27

This paper explores various interpretations of moral responsibility in Plato's Timaeus, addressing the puzzle posed by Taylor on the relationship between determinism and human agency. Four main solutions are analyzed: the denial of authorship, the pedagogical approach, the afterlife theory, and the nuanced causality interpretation; it is argued that all these ultimately fall into the same determinism they aim to resolve. Finally, a fifth interpretative approach, the narrative approach, is proposed, suggesting that the determinism in the Timaeus relates to the narrative aspects of the dialogue: Timaeus, as a politician, discusses human nature as something determinable by politics, not in an absolute sense.

Basically intelligent

Shawn Christopher Vigil — 2025-10-27

Basic income is a novel social welfare policy proposal that looks to preserve liberal-egalitarian principles by offering a cash entitlement delivered regularly to every individual in a given society without any stipulations (e.g., work or income requirements). The interest in such kinds of programs has grown larger in the context of exponential technological advancement, with anxieties about the prospect of AI displacing large portions of human labour abounding. However, while the problem of automation has been addressed in the basic income literature, very little philosophical treatment of it has been offered. The present essay aims to fill this gap by elucidating, evaluating, and articulating philosophical arguments that lie at the intersection of AI and ethics. The first argument deals with the question of ontology, viz., whether it is possible in principle for AI to perform all tasks associated with human labour. This argument is explored through a critique of Searle’s well-known arguments against the computational theory of mind, together with Dreyfus’s phenomenological perspective on the significance of context for sense-making. It is suggested that even if AI might not be able to authentically instantiate intelligence of a general kind, it might nevertheless be capable of adequately performing all tasks associated with human labour. The second argument deals with economic reasoning, viz.,whether it would be rational for firms to substitute human labour for AI. It is suggested that micro- and macro-economic rationales betray each other and therefore cannot reliably discount the possibility of significant or complete displacement of human labour. Given that AI remains in principle a possible threat to socio-economic welfare via its relation to labour markets, we end by considering how basic income is uniquely situated to remedy the situation.

ESCEPTICISMO METAFILOSÓFICO, AUTODERROTA Y JUSTIFICACIÓN PRAGMÁTICA

Shih-Hao Liu — 2025-10-27

El escepticismo metafilosófico sostiene que debemos suspender nuestras creencias sobre afirmaciones filosóficas. Anteriormente, muchos argumentaron que los desacuerdos prevalentes entre filósofos pares motivan dicho escepticismo. Una respuesta antiescéptica inmediata es que el escepticismo metafilosófico es epistémicamente autoderrotante. En resumen, el escepticismo metafilosófico exige la suspensión de las creencias sobre los presupuestos utilizados en los argumentos a favor de la propia posición. Esto hace que la posición escéptica exija, en última instancia, la suspensión de creencia en sí misma. Muchos consideran que el problema de la autoderrota es un desafío que los escépticos metafilosóficos difícilmente pueden superar. En este artículo, en nombre de los escépticos, argumentaré que es posible que el escepticismo metafilosófico eluda el problema de la autoderrota mediante la noción de justificación práctica. Primero contrasto la visión evidencialista tradicional sobre la ética de la creencia –según la cual las creencias solo pueden justificarse epistémicamente – con la visión del pragmatista, que sostiene que las creencias también pueden justificarse prácticamente. Para los pragmatistas, mientras mantener una creencia favorezca algún interés práctico, como el mantenimiento de una vida ordinaria floreciente, dicha creencia puede estar justificada pragmáticamente, incluso si la evidencia que posee un agente es neutral o silenciosa con respecto a la justificación de esa misma creencia. Sostengo que la justificación de los presupuestos utilizados en los argumentos escépticos metafilosóficos también puede explicarse mediante la perspectiva pragmatista. Es decir, estos presupuestos pueden estar epistémicamente derrotados según los propios argumentos escépticos metafilosóficos. Sin embargo, los escépticos, en un sentido pragmático, todavía son racionales al utilizar dichos presupuestos, ya que exhiben cierto valor práctico. Mientras que la autoderrota puede ser un problema serio en el ámbito epistémico, no lo es tanto en el ámbito práctico, ya que muchos principios pueden ser implícitamente autoderrotados y aun así estar justificados pragmáticamente.

Is motor representation a potential answer to the problem of causal deviance?

Yukun Chen — 2025-10-27

This paper examines the problem of causal deviance in theories of intentional action and the role of motor representations in trying to solve it. The problem arises when an agent’s intention and action correspond to an outcome, but there is a deviance in the causal chain causing the outcome accidental rather than intentional. Four current theories that involves proposing motor representations as a solution are critically analysed: the Deferral View, Motor Schema View, Dual Content View, and Same Format View. While insightful. I then present a case study involving causal deviance for motor representations themselves, arguing that even with motor representations, the accidental nature of action outcomes cannot be ruled out under a causalist framework. Finally, I suggest moving beyond causalist views, drawing inspiration from an alternative view that cognitions merely bias rather than causally produce motor representations and actions.

Semantics of the liar paradox

C. P. Hertogh — 2025-10-27

Although Liar-type conundrums –traditionally considered sophistry– do not match all characteristics of thought experiments (TE), particularly not the pragmaticist condition that thought experiments are designed to resolve predefined problems, we apply TE analyses and interpretations.

The Liar (or, let's say, Liar-type statements involving truth (predicates), self-reference as in the fields of conceptual analysis, semantics and set theory) rose to paradigmatic, revolutionary prominence by Tarski's Gödelian logicistic deliberations in the beginning of last century now considered the orthodox semantic account.

We survey semiotic and pragmatic accounts from the second half of last century and (non)classical (meta)logical accounts that may gain traction in 21st century.

Our resolution is manifold, both semantic and pragmatic. We show that modern logic, from the very beginning in Wittgenstein, has had more than two truth-values, next to T(rue) and F(alse), 'nonsense', 'meaningless', 'senseless', etc.

We show that the Liar may bring up for discussion logical principles like law of excluded middle (LEM) and noncontradiction (LNC) and refute strong versions of these logical laws. We propose a pragmatic Gricean account of the Liar, analyzing Epimenides's and Eubulides' versions of the Liar as falsification of generic tacit conversational principle –Grice’smaxim of quality and maxim of manner– that people usually speak truthful, speak perspicuously.

By application of TE Matrix Epimenides-style and Eubulides-style paradoxes can be extended to valid and sound modus tollens-style arguments with logical force of enthymeme.

Radical contextualism and open compositionality

Pablo David Chávez Carvajal — 2025-10-27

In this paper, I explore the relationship between radical contextualism and compositionality. Radical contextualism is a family of theories defending that a sentence’s meaning in natural language is always invariant because it is too broad and unspecified to be otherwise and requires contextual adjustment. Compositionality is the idea that a sentence’s complex meaning comprises its parts. I shall evaluate whether radical contextualism benefits from including compositionality to explain linguistic meaning in natural language. Including compositionality might allow us to formalize aspects of radical contextualism and explain meaning-formation more precisely. I shall argue, nonetheless, that the classical notion of composition fails to account for the interpretation of sentence meaning in natural languages (as guided by a radical contextualist theory). An open compositionality scheme is crucial since I understand meaning-determination as a decision-making task. To explain how we understand sentences in natural language, open compositionality must be used to formulate a radical contextualist theory. I shall also offer a novel metatheory encompassing open compositionality and radical contextualism.

Language and “the mystical” in early wittgenstein

Javier Antonio Torres-Vindas — 2025-10-27

This article examines the relationship between language and "the mystical" in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, emphasizing its opaque nature and its ethical-epistemic implications. First, it analyses the pictorial theory of language: propositions are logical figures (Bild) that share a logical form (Logische Form) with worldly facts, yet their limits prevent the expression of an "ultimate meaning." Second, it explores "the mystical" as the ineffable: the very existence of the world (6.44) and its perception as a bounded totality (6.45), which can only be shown (6.522), not stated. Third, it derives ethical-aesthetic consequences: the metaphysical subject, as the limit of the world (5.632), attains happiness through an aesthetic contemplation that accepts the world without intervention (will outside the world, 6.373). Ethics and aesthetics converge in a contemplative stance toward the mystical, whose logical inexpressibility demands silence (7). Thus, the Tractatus transcends positivism by pointing toward the transcendental through its own self-limitation.

Ethical frameworks in civil engineering

Gabriel Montúfar — 2025-10-27

This article examines the intersection of philosophical ethics and civil engineering in Panama, focusing on sustainability and risks in current infrastructure projects. Drawing on ethical frameworks such as utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics, it reflects on how these principles guide decision-making in urban and environmental development contexts. Key projects analyzed include the Panama Metro Line 3, the Panama-David Train, and Puerto Barú, highlighting challenges like corruption, seismic risks, floods, and opportunities for integral sustainability. The objective is to underscore the need for ethical practices that prioritize long-term social and environmental welfare. Main achievements include identifying corruption as a major amplifier of natural risks and proposing recommendations for transparent, resilient engineering. Conclusions emphasize integrating philosophical ethics to foster inclusive development in Panama, learning from historical lessons like the French Panama Canal failure.

Critical thinkng

José Antonio Mathurín — 2025-10-27

The present article is a reflexive exercise, as well as a proposal, around nature, meaning, aims, value, and perspectives of critical thinking; the purely conceptual dimension of expression is distinguished its semantic scope, as well as that of practical normative nature, and its applicability. This reflection appears structured in five thematic axes articulated around a basic premise, namely: critical thinking is essentially philosophical thought. These thematic axes are expressed as follows: (i) Critical thinking: historical / cultural referential contexts. (ii) What is critical thinking: conceptual framework and conceptual precisions. (iii) The development of critical thinking: self-critical attitude and capabilities logical/argumentative, (iv) The levels of applicability of critical thinking. (v) Critical thinking, democracy, citizenship, and political order. Each of these components can be considered as an autonomous unit and independent, without losing its organic articulation with the rest.

Distinction and complementarity between ethics and morality. An approach from moral philosophy

Alessandro Caviglia — 2025-10-27

This paper addresses the distinction and complementarity between ethics and morality, seeking to clarify the philosophical implications of this case. It begins by examining philosophical approaches that view ethics and morality as synonymous terms, then presents ethics as a study of morality, understood as a synonym for the customs of a locality. Thus, Giusti, following Hegel, establishes the distinction between “morality” and “ethical life” to present two approaches for providing a rational foundation for customs. We point out, rather, that ethics aims to analyze ways of life, while morality introduces the negative principle of not confusing a person with an object, which allows for the correction of ways of life when they are damaged by phenomena such as domination or moral damage of various kinds.

Thus, ethics concerns the ends and values we project onto things, as well as the value we project onto personal and community relationships, such as friendship, romantic relationships, or family relationships. In such relationships, forms of abuse and domination by one party over the others can occur because some people may claim the right to unilaterally define and redefine the meaning of the relationship, generating a damaged way of life because some people are treated as mere means or objects. In this situation, it becomes necessary to introduce the moral principle, which is completely external to the ethical way of life, to repair the damage it generates. Only in this way would be damage caused be repaired, since ethics lacks sufficient resources to correct itself satisfactorily and clearly establish the distinction between people and things.

From essence to construction

Aiswarya Pradeep Kumar — 2025-10-27

This study traces the journey of the philosophical evolution of the “self” within the background of feminist theory across its three major waves. The study investigates how feminist thought has critically interrogated and transformed traditional conception of identity. The analysis is structured in three sections: The Autonomous self, From the Private to Political, Fragmented Selves and Fluid Identities. By drawing on key feminist thinkers such as Mary Wollstonecraft, Simone de Beauvoir, Judith Butler, this article shows how feminist discourse has shifted the notion of the self from a fixed, rational subject to a dynamic, socially constructed, and performative subject. The study concludes that feminist philosophy not only challenges essentialist views of gender but also redefines subjectivity itself, contributing to broader debates in contemporary political and philosophical thought.

Reframing suffering

Richa Singh — 2025-10-27

This study investigates the role of Buddhist mindfulness techniques as foundational values in the emerging field of philosophical counselling. Bridging Eastern contemplative traditions and Western philosophical practice, the paper argues that mindfulness understood not merely as meditation but as active, value-oriented awareness; can significantly contribute to the goals of philosophical counselling. Both traditions prioritize self-awareness, ethical reflection, and the alleviation of suffering through insight rather than clinical diagnosis. Drawing on the Buddhist concept of the “Second Arrow,” the paper illustrates how mindfulness can help individuals differentiate between inevitable pain and the optional suffering caused by reactive thought patterns.

The research further explores how mindfulness, grounded in the Pali concept of sati, encompasses memory, attentiveness, and ethical clarity, making it a potent tool for value-based dialogue and emotional clarity and resilience. By situating mindfulness within the framework of non-clinical, philosophical dialogue, the study challenges conventional therapeutic models and highlights a humanistic, integrative approach to counselling. This paper proposes that the synthesis of Buddhist mindfulness and philosophical counselling not only enhances individual well-being but also contributes to a broader discourse on wisdom, agency, and ethical living in contemporary society.

Williams and Dussel on opacity

Chris Sawyer — 2025-10-27

This paper examines the role of opacity in the thought of Bernard Williams and Enrique Dussel, and develops a philosophical method oriented toward non-totalization. In Williams’s ethics, opacity marks the internal limits of moral justification: the individual cannot and should not make all aspects of their ethical life transparent to others or to themselves. Integrity, for Williams, resides not in public coherence but in the lived coherence of one’s commitments, which remain partially inarticulable. In contrast, Dussel identifies opacity at the structural level—as the condition of exteriority that totalizing systems must exclude in order to sustain their coherence. Through his concept of analectics, Dussel maintains that this exclusion is not accidental but constitutive: the Other is not simply marginalized but rendered epistemically invisible. By placing these two accounts into dialogue, the paper argues that opacity should be treated not as a failure of knowledge or clarity, but as a methodological principle. This principle finds further support in recursive systems, where self-reference generates non-coincidence from within. The resulting framework affirms opacity as a condition of ethical, structural, and conceptual integrity. Rather than seeking philosophical totality, the method outlined here sustains the limits of systems as an active site of reflection. Opacity, in this sense, becomes not what philosophy must overcome, but with what it must think.

Human being and knowledge in the early works of George Siemens

Freddy Varona Domínguez — 2025-10-27

This paper reflects on the place that George Siemens gives to the human being in the conception of knowledge he expounds in his early works. The objective was to analyze the place of the human being in this conception. The idea defended is that the conception of knowledge that Siemens expounds in his early works does not suppress the human being but relegates them to lower levels of importance. One achievement of this research is having captured the overvaluation of some results of human activity above the human being; the greatest result is to note that we must be alert to the subtlety of dehumanization. Among the conclusions is that because of the fundamental importance of technology in Siemens' conception of knowledge, it can be considered a technological conception of knowledge.

Foundations of scrutonian conservatism

Joshua Isaac Ramírez Donner — 2025-10-27

This essay examines the foundations of Scrutonian conservatism, focusing on the sacredness of Western culture, which keeps its value, even without being considered a divine gift. Unlike theologically based conservatism, Scruton emphasizes secular order while acknowledging the influence of religious origins. Scruton’s concept of the sacred incorporates love as a guiding principle that connects humanity through shared familial bonds, particularly within the Western context. This analysis presents Scrutonian conservatism as an attempt to offer a metaphysical framework grounded in cultural and historical content, serving as a foundation for identity, delving into his roots, his concept of the sacred, and his criteria for truth.

Comments on Schopenhauer’s critique of Kant regarding the thing-in-itself and the law of causality

Ruling Barragán Yáñez — 2025-10-27

The purpose of this text is to comment on Schopenhauer’s critique of Kantian thought, particularly the idea of the thing-in-itself and the notion of causality as upheld by the philosopher of Königsberg. First, I will address Schopenhauer’s arguments against Kant concerning the thing-in-itself. Next, I will consider Schopenhauer’s line of reasoning against Kant’s view of causality. Finally, in the absence of a strict conclusion, I will share a few conjectures that might shed light on the argumentative deficiencies that Schopenhauer attributes to his master.