Derechos de autor 2026 Analítica
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Debates about whether conscious mental states can cause any physical or mental events have traditionally been about human beings; non-human animals (hereafter ‘animals’) are rarely the focus. This is understandable as studying animal minds has proven difficult. I cannot experience an animal’s phenomenology, I cannot ask an animal what beliefs and intentions she has, and I cannot know why an animal chose to behave in one way rather than another. Despite the epistemic limitations of examining animal minds, I will argue that some human mental states are causally irrelevant if and only if this is also true of some animals, and mental causation occurs in some humans if and only if it also occurs in some animals.
Este obra está bajo una licencia de Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0 Internacional.
