Monotonía y derrotabilidad: El caso del derecho

Francisco Diaz Montilla

doi:10.48204/contacto.v4n2.6674

Submitted January 6, 2025

Published 2025-01-10

Artículos académicos

Vol. 4 No. 2 (2024): Revista Contacto

Monotonicity and defeasibility: The case of law

Francisco Diaz Montilla⁺⁻

DOI https://doi.org/10.48204/contacto.v4n2.6674

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References

DOI: 10.48204/contacto.v4n2.6674

Published: 2025-01-10

How to Cite

Diaz Montilla, F. (2025). Monotonicity and defeasibility: The case of law. Revista Contacto, 4(2), 76–85. https://doi.org/10.48204/contacto.v4n2.6674

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

Abstract

In this work we will argue that legal reasoning is best understood as an instance of defeasible reasoning. So, it is important to distinguish between defeasible and not defeasible rule of inference. Perhaps the paradigmatic example is modus ponens. Given a legal rule R, R has the following form: A ® B, where A refers to a factual condition and B refers to a legal consequence. So, if A holds, then B is the case. But in some situations, exceptions can arise, and this means that B only holds probably. So, there are not conclusive modus ponens in law, defeatable.

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References

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