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The aim of this paper is to reflect upon the scope of political knowledge as a counterpoint to the epistocratic argument defended by Jason Brennan in Against Democracy. To this end, I will begin by presenting Brennan’s conception of knowledge and ignorance, together with his interpretation of the nature of politics. I will then investigate the meaning of knowledge and ignorance from the standpoint of virtue epistemology. Following this, I will analyze the very essence of the political domain and consider the public virtues of prudence and civic friendship. Lastly, I will discuss the phenomenon of moral progress, in order to show that tribalism is neither the essence of human moral nature nor a preclusion of political knowledge and that there is thus no conclusive reason for defending the restriction of public participation in the political process.