Copyright (c) 2025 Analítica
Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Basic income is a novel social welfare policy proposal that looks to preserve liberal-egalitarian principles by offering a cash entitlement delivered regularly to every individual in a given society without any stipulations (e.g., work or income requirements). The interest in such kinds of programs has grown larger in the context of exponential technological advancement, with anxieties about the prospect of AI displacing large portions of human labour abounding. However, while the problem of automation has been addressed in the basic income literature, very little philosophical treatment of it has been offered. The present essay aims to fill this gap by elucidating, evaluating, and articulating philosophical arguments that lie at the intersection of AI and ethics. The first argument deals with the question of ontology, viz., whether it is possible in principle for AI to perform all tasks associated with human labour. This argument is explored through a critique of Searle’s well-known arguments against the computational theory of mind, together with Dreyfus’s phenomenological perspective on the significance of context for sense-making. It is suggested that even if AI might not be able to authentically instantiate intelligence of a general kind, it might nevertheless be capable of adequately performing all tasks associated with human labour. The second argument deals with economic reasoning, viz.,whether it would be rational for firms to substitute human labour for AI. It is suggested that micro- and macro-economic rationales betray each other and therefore cannot reliably discount the possibility of significant or complete displacement of human labour. Given that AI remains in principle a possible threat to socio-economic welfare via its relation to labour markets, we end by considering how basic income is uniquely situated to remedy the situation.
Este obra está bajo una licencia de Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0 Internacional.
