Direitos de Autor (c) 2025 Analítica
Este trabalho encontra-se publicado com a Licença Internacional Creative Commons Atribuição-NãoComercial-CompartilhaIgual 4.0.
This paper examines the problem of causal deviance in theories of intentional action and the role of motor representations in trying to solve it. The problem arises when an agent’s intention and action correspond to an outcome, but there is a deviance in the causal chain causing the outcome accidental rather than intentional. Four current theories that involves proposing motor representations as a solution are critically analysed: the Deferral View, Motor Schema View, Dual Content View, and Same Format View. While insightful. I then present a case study involving causal deviance for motor representations themselves, arguing that even with motor representations, the accidental nature of action outcomes cannot be ruled out under a causalist framework. Finally, I suggest moving beyond causalist views, drawing inspiration from an alternative view that cognitions merely bias rather than causally produce motor representations and actions.
Este obra está bajo una licencia de Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0 Internacional.
