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This study analyzed the reconfiguration of Panama's political-economic pact during the Great Depression (1929-1936). The research employed a qualitative historical-documentary design with secondary quantitative analysis, triangulating primary sources (AP/UPI journalistic coverage from 1931, State Department documents, Hoover's memoirs) and academic secondary sources (Kalmanovitz, Vanes Álamo, Guardia). The results revealed that the crisis exposed pre-existing structural vulnerabilities: an operational budget of $14.3 million with debt of $16-18 million, a regressive tax system based on imports (43.3%) and exemption of Canal workers' salaries, and critical dependence on $250,000 annuities. The 30% fiscal contraction (1929-1933) triggered a legitimacy crisis culminating in the January 1931 coup d'état. The Harmodio Arias government (1932-1936) responded with innovative fiscal reforms, implementation of income tax (1934), protectionist tariff policy, and renegotiation of the 1936 Treaty, which increased the annuity to $430,000 and eliminated the interventionist clause, establishing an "asymmetric partnership" regime. It is concluded that the crisis acted as a catalyst for structural transformation through "structured negotiation," increasing relative state autonomy without revolutionary rupture and laying foundations for subsequent developmentalism.
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